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1 Introduction
Assume that a consumer wants to buy the last model of a Sony PlayStation
console. There are two stores in town and the consumer is not aware of
the prices that they charge. His choice procedure (called satisficing) is to
first visit the store nearby, find out what price it charges, and in case it is
satisfactory buy the product. Otherwise, he plans to visit the other store.1
Stores are aware that the price that the consumer considers to be satisfactory
is influenced by the marketing signals they send out. For example, assume
that the stores publicize (via leaflets, radio, TV, internet) the fact that their
PlayStations are running out of stock. This information puts pressure on
the consumer and plausibly increases the chances that he is willing to stop
searching at the store nearby, even though the price it charges is relatively
high. The reason is that the consumer is afraid that by postponing the
purchase and visiting the competitor, the stores will run out of products.
That is, the marketing signal of reduced product availability increases the
consumer’s aspiration price (i.e., the price that the consumer considers to
be satisfactory) and, consequently, reduces his willingness to search. On the
other hand, the announcement that the provisions of the product under con-
sideration are substantial relaxes the pressure on the consumer, presumably
reduces his aspiration price, and, consequently, induces more active search
behaviour.
The strategic interaction described above is non-trivial. Should stores
send out marketing signals aimed at increasing or decreasing the consumer’s
aspiration price? Increasing the aspiration price reduces the chances that
1An alternative interpretation is that the consumer first inspects the price charged by
the store whose web-site appears first on Google. If it is not satisfactory, he visits the
second web-site on the list.
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a firm is inspected, but at the same time allows firms to charge higher
prices. Which price should stores charge, given that the consumer’s aspi-
ration price is endogenously determined? Do stores pricing and marketing
strategies harm the consumer?
Over the last few years, the satisficing model has attracted attention from
both an experimental and a theoretical viewpoint.2 The consumer, rather
than performing a complicated calculation to derive the optimal stopping
rule, follows a simple heuristic: if you are satisfied with the current alterna-
tive stop, if not keep searching. Once you stop, choose the best discovered
alternative (Simon, 1955).3
In this paper I investigate a price-competition model in which two profit-
maximizing firms simultaneously choose a price p from the unit interval and
a costless marketing signal s aimed at influencing the consumer’s aspiration
price. The consumer follows the satisficing heuristic described above and
his maximum willingness to pay for the product is normalized to one. The
consumer is assigned to firm i with probability 1
2
(his default) and his decision
of inspecting firm j depends on whether or not firm i charges a price that
meets his aspiration price, which is endogenously determined, with i ∈ {1, 2}
and i 6= j. I consider the simplest setting by assuming that firms can send
out either a low or a high marketing signal (zero or one, respectively). I
2For instance see Caplin, Dean and Martin (2011) and Reutskaja et al. (2011) as
experimental studies and Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and Caplin and Dean (2011) as
choice-theoretic studies on satisficing.
3The version of the satisficing heuristic studied here is called best-satisficing in the
sense that if the consumer does not find any satisfactory product, then he buys the best
unsatisfactory one among those discovered (i.e., I am implicitly assuming perfect recall).
Alternatively, last-satisficing implies that if no satisfactory product is identified, the con-
sumer buys the last discovered product (e.g. see Rubinstein and Salant (2006)). A third
possibility is that if there is no satisfactory product, the consumer chooses nothing (he
postpones). Best-satisficing is a plausible assumption in the circumstances in which the
consumer urgently needs a product.
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assume that the consumer’s aspiration price is a convex combination of the
two signals he receives, where the weight assigned to the high marketing
signal is captured by an exogenous parameter α ∈ (0, 1). An interpretation
is that the consumer receives one marketing signal from each firm prior to
starting the search process. Then, through a more or less conscious process
(which I call aspiration-price function), he forms an aspiration price, which
determines his search behaviour, by somehow combining the two signals he
receives. In a section below, besides the aspiration-price function described
here, I discuss other processes through which marketing signals determine
the consumer’s aspiration price by linking my framework to related models,
such as Bertrand (1883), Varian (1980), and Piccione and Spiegler (2012).
An interesting implication of the model is that, depending on firms’ mar-
keting decisions, the consumer’s aspiration price can be equal to either 0 , 1,
or α ∈ (0, 1). The first case occurs when both firms choose s = 0 and implies
that the consumer is ‘never satisfied’ and his search behaviour is equivalent
to that of standard Bertrand’s consumer; the second case occurs when both
firms choose s = 1 and implies that the consumer is satisfied at any price
level and always sticks to the default; the third case occurs when firms send
out different marketing signals and implies that the consumer inspects both
firms only if the price charged by the default is strictly greater than an in-
termediate aspiration price α ∈ (0, 1). While the first two cases have been
extensively studied in the literature (e.g. see Piccione and Spiegler (2012)
and Chiovenau and Zhou (2013)), the latter is one of the novel aspects of the
model: whether a price comparison is made simultaneously depends on the
marketing decisions and the pricing strategies.
In a section below I show that in the unique symmetric equilibrium firms
randomize over both marketing signals and prices. As one expects, in equi-
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librium the probability that a low (resp., high) signal is sent out is decreasing
(resp., increasing) in the weight α that the consumer assigns to the high sig-
nal in forming his aspiration price. Conditional on sending out a low signal,
firms randomize over the price according to an atomless cdf. On the contrary,
conditional on sending out a high signal, firms charge two prices only - α and
1, the feasible consumer’s aspiration prices when one firm sends out a high
signal - with positive probability. Interestingly when α is low there is a gap
in the support of pricing cdf conditional on sending out a low signal. That
is, both a price interval below α and a price interval above α are assigned
positive mass, but there is a price interval just above α to which zero mass
is assigned. The reason is that by increasing the price from α to a price just
above α, firms lose market power, because with some probability the con-
sumer does not stop searching anymore at the default. This is because the
price the default charges is not any longer satisfactory when the consumer’s
aspiration price is α and, as a result, the increase in the price from α to a
price just above it does not offset the loss in market shares. On the other
hand, as soon as α increases above a certain threshold the gap in the support
disappears in the sense that only a price interval below α is assigned positive
mass. It turns out that whether or not firms assign positive mass to an inter-
val of unsatisfactory prices above α plays an important role in determining
the consumer’s welfare in equilibrium.
The main finding of this paper is that firms profits in equilibrium increase
with α in absolute value, but there exists a threshold α¯ such that for all val-
ues of α smaller than α¯ firms profits are strictly greater than the constrained
competitive level - the max-min payoff - and for all values of α greater than
α¯ firms profits are equal to the max-min payoff.4 This result is surprising, as
4Other papers studying oligopoly models define exploitation as the difference between
firms equilibrium profits and the max-min payoff. E.g. see Piccione and Spiegler (2012).
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one would expect that as the weight α that the consumer devotes to the high
marketing signal increases, the chances that the consumer gets exploited in-
crease, because the consumer is satisfied with higher prices. On the contrary,
when α is small, competitive forces are unable to drive firms profits to the
max-min level.
The intuition behind this result is linked with the structure of the support
of the pricing cdf conditional on sending out a low signal. It turns out that
the source of extra profits above the max-min level is given by the fact that
when α is low, conditional on sending out a low signal, firms charge with
positive probability prices greater than α. Note that such prices do not meet
any consumer’s aspiration price (neither 0 nor α) conditional on one firm
sending out a low signal. However, as α increases, the gap in the support
mentioned above shifts to the right. This in turn implies that the interval
of unsatisfactory prices above α to which positive mass is assigned shrinks
and, as soon as α grows above the threshold α¯, disappears. Therefore, for
a sufficiently big α, no price intervals above α are assigned positive mass
implying that the source of extra profits vanishes.
An implication of this result is that incentivizing an ex-ante active search
behaviour when the consumer is satisficing has two opposite effects from the
welfare analysis’ point of view: on the one hand, it reduces firms profits in
absolute terms, but, on the other hand, it leads to consumer’s exploitation in
the sense that firms make greater profits than the max-min level. This result
suggests that the fact that the consumer is ‘more satisficing’ and, as a result,
searches relatively less does not translate into higher levels of exploitation.
I conclude the equilibrium analysis by discussing the consumer’s search
behaviour and the switching rate in equilibrium. As expected, I find that the
probability that the consumer stops searching at the default firm increases
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with α and the switching rate decreases with α.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on behavioural industrial organization
(Ellison, 2006; Armstrong, 2008; Spiegler, 2011). The well-known Varian
(1980)’s model assumes that firms simultaneously compete on price and there
is a fraction of consumers (called informed) that make a price comparison
and a fraction of consumers (called uninformed) that stick to the default.5
Both Carlin (2009) and Chiovenau and Zhou (2013) extend Varian (1980)
by assuming that the fraction of informed and uninformed consumers is en-
dogenously determined. In Carlin (2009)’s model along with a price firms
choose its complexity and it is assumed that more complex price structures
reduce the fraction of informed consumers. On the other hand, Chiovenau
and Zhou (2013) assume that firms can manipulate the extent to which con-
sumers are informed by framing their products in a certain way and, unlike
in Carlin (2009), in their model how a firm’s frame influences the extent
to which a price comparison is made depends upon the competitors’ frame
decisions. Finally, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) focus their attention on the
two-firm case by considering a more general framework than Chiovenau and
Zhou (2013).6 Their most important result is that competitive forces drive
firms profits to the max-min level in equilibrium if and only if each firm can
neutralize the effects of the opponent’s framing decisions by choosing a suit-
able mixture of frames (this property is called Weighted Regularity). Unlike
all these studies, my model implies that whether or not a price comparison is
made, depends on both pricing and marketing strategies. In particular, when-
5Actually Varian (1980) is considered to be a model of standard industrial organization.
However, I discuss it here for expositional purposes.
6See Spiegler (2014) for an extension.
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ever the consumer’s aspiration price is some intermediate price α ∈ (0, 1),
then the consumer makes a price comparison only if the price charged by the
default firm is strictly greater than α. On the contrary, in the above models
the consumer’s decision of sticking to the default is independent of the price
it charges.
This paper is also related to the non-behavioural industrial organization
literature on consumer search. Burdett and Judd (1983) investigate a com-
petitive market with non-sequential consumer search. Stahl (1989), on the
other hand, bridges the gap between the polar results obtained by Bertrand
(1883) (firms charge the price equal to the marginal cost in the absence of
search costs) and Diamond (1971) (firms charge the monopoly price if search
costs are bounded above zero) by assuming sequential search. More recently,
Arbatskaya (2007) and Zhou (2011) propose a model in which the consumer
inspects firms according to a fixed ordering by assuming homogeneous and
differentiated products, respectively. The closest paper to my work is Arm-
strong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), according to which the consumer first in-
spects a ‘prominent’ firm and, in case he is not satisfied with its product,
examines the remaining firms in a random order in a framework of differ-
entiated products. Unlike my work, these studies explicitly formalize search
costs and assume that the consumer searches optimally. On the contrary,
I implicitly assume that searching is costly and that the consumer’s search
behaviour is characterized by his aspiration price (and, therefore, it is not
necessarily optimal), which is endogenously determined by firms’ marketing
decisions.
The choice-theoretic foundations of the satisficing heuristic have been ex-
tensively studied. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) investigate a model in which
the decision-maker examines alternatives sequentially and stops searching as
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soon as he identifies a satisfactory alternative. If he does not find any, he
chooses the last available option. On the other hand, Caplin and Dean
(2011) examine a model of sequential search in which the choice-process data
technique is utilized, according to which not only final choices, but also inter-
mediate ones are taken into account.7 While in these studies the consumer’s
aspiration level is inferred from choices, in my paper it is determined by firms
decisions.
Finally, this paper is related to the experimental literature on satisficing.
Caplin, Dean and Martin (2011) test Caplin and Dean (2011) by implement-
ing experimentally choice process data. On the other hand, Reutskaja et al.
(2011) test subjects decisions on snack items under time pressure by using
eye-tracking. Both studies provide evidence that subjects behaviour is con-
sistent with the satisficing heuristic.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the formal model; Section 3 discusses several aspiration-price functions; Sec-
tion 4 illustrates the equilibrium analysis; Section 5 concludes by discussing
limitations and extensions. All proofs are relegated in the appendix.
2 The Model
I assume that there are two profit-maximizing firms that produce a homo-
geneous good at zero costs. Each firm simultaneously chooses a price in
the interval [0, 1] and decides whether to send out either a low (s = 0) or
a high (s = 1) marketing signal. Formally, a firm strategy is denoted by
(p, s) ∈ [0, 1]× {0, 1}.
Marketing is interpreted as persuasive in the sense that it is aimed at
affecting the consumer’s aspiration price. As illustrated in the introduction,
7Other studies are Horan (2010) and Papi (2012).
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an example is publicizing statements about the availability of the products.
If the consumer is told that there are few products left in store, then his as-
piration price is likely to increase. That is, he is less willing to postpone the
purchase and continue the search process even if the inspected firm charges
a relatively high price, as he is afraid that by waiting and visiting the com-
petitors the stores will run out of products. On the contrary, if he is told
that provisions are substantial, his aspiration price is likely to decrease.
I assume that there is one consumer assigned to firm 1 and firm 2 with
equal probability.8 That is, I assume two equally likely states of the world:
one in which the consumer’s default is firm 1 and one in which it is firm
2. His maximum willingness to pay for the product is normalized to one.
The consumer is satisficing in the sense that he inspects the price of the
firm he is assigned to. If it is satisfactory, then he stops searching, otherwise
he explores the other firm. Once that the consumer stops, he buys the
cheapest product discovered (i.e., search is with perfect recall). I assume
that the consumer’s aspiration price is determined by the marketing signals.
Let a(s1, s2) : {0, 1}2 → ∆[0, 1] denote the consumer’s aspiration-price
function. The interpretation is that a(s1, s1) is the consumer’s aspiration
price when firm 1 sends out signal s1 and firm 2 signal s2. I allow for the
possibility of a stochastic aspiration price by assuming that the aspiration-
price function maps the set of profiles of marketing signals into the set of
probability distributions over the unit interval. Actually my analysis focuses
on a deterministic aspiration-price function, but I will use the (more general)
stochastic definition to discuss some relevant examples.
The timing of the model is as follows. In period 0 firms choose a price
and a marketing signal; in period 1 the consumer is subject to the marketing
8An equivalent interpretation is that there is a unit mass of consumers, half of which
are assigned to firm 1 and half to firm 2.
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signals and his aspiration price is formed; in period 2 the consumer makes
his own searching and purchasing decisions.
Firm i’s profit function is as follows. Denote by a˜(s1, s2) the (ex-ante
unknown) realized aspiration price of the distribution a(s1, s2).
pii((pi, si), (pj, sj)) ≡

pi if pi < pj and pj > a˜(s1, s2)
pi
2
if pi = pj or pi, pj ≤ a˜(s1, s2)
0 otherwise
Firm i gets all market shares (pi) with probability one whenever it is
cheaper than firm j (pi < pj) and firm j’s price is unsatisfactory (pj >
a˜(s1, s2)). The latter implies that in the state of the world in which the
consumer is assigned to firm j, he realizes that the default firm charges an
unsatisfactory price, inspects firm i, and finds out that it is cheaper. On
the other hand, firms obtain all market shares with equal probability (pi
2
)
whenever they either charge the same price (pi = pj) or a satisfactory one
(pi, pj ≤ a˜(s1, s2)). If both firms charge a satisfactory price, then there is no
search and the consumer sticks to his default firm in all states of the world.
Finally, in all the other cases, firm i gets zero market shares (0).
Without imposing any structure on the aspiration-price function the model
has little content. In the next section I discuss several examples of promi-
nent functions. Throughout the analysis I restrict my attention to symmetric
equilibria.
3 Examples of Aspiration-Price Functions
1. Bertrand (1883). If a(s1, s2) ≡ k with probability 1 for any (s1, s2) for
some k ∈ [0, 1], then the resulting model collapses into a Bertrand com-
petition setting where the minimum price charged is k. Hence, in the
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unique symmetric equilibrium, firms set the price at k and marketing
is irrelevant.
2. Ignoring the high/low marketing signal. Assume that a(s1, s2) ≡ min{s1, s2}
with probability 1. That is, the consumer’s aspiration price is always
equal to the minimum of the two marketing signals. This aspiration-
price function induces a result identical to the one produced by stan-
dard Bertrand, as in the unique symmetric equilibrium firms set the
price at zero and send out a low signal and the consumer’s welfare is
maximized.
On the other hand, if a(s1, s2) ≡ max{s1, s2} with probability 1, then
the consumer considers only the highest of the two marketing signals.
In the unique symmetric equilibrium, firms set the price at one and
send out a high signal and the consumer’s welfare is minimized.
3. Informed-Uninformed Consumers (Varian, 1980). Let q ∈ (0, 1). For
any (s1, s2), let
a(s1, s2) ≡ 1 with probability q and 0 otherwise
This aspiration-price function generates an exogenous probability dis-
tribution over ‘extreme’ aspiration prices (either zero or one). This im-
plies that with probability 1−q the consumer makes a price comparison
and buys the cheapest product (informed consumer) and with proba-
bility q he sticks to the default independently of the price it charges
(uninformed consumer).
4. Limited Comparability (Piccione and Spiegler, 2012).9 Let q0, q1, q ∈
9See also Chiovenau and Zhou (2013).
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(0, 1). Define
a(s1, s2) ≡

1 with probability q0 and 0 otherwise if s1 = s2 = 0
1 with probability q1 and 0 otherwise if s1 = s2 = 1
1 with probability q and 0 otherwise otherwise
A limited-comparability aspiration-price function extends Varian (1980)
by assuming that the probability distribution over ‘extreme’ aspiration
prices is determined by the marketing signals. In Piccione and Spiegler
(2012)’s terms marketing signals - called ‘frames’ - induce comparison
probabilities across products.
5. Convex Combination. Let (s1, s2) be a pair of marketing signals. De-
note by s¯(s1, s2) and s(s1, s2) the highest and the lowest marketing
signals, respectively. Formally,
s¯(s1, s2) ≡
 max{s1, s2} if s1 6= s2s1 otherwise
and s(s1, s2) ∈ {s1, s2} \ {s¯}.
The consumer’s aspiration price is a convex combination of s¯ and s.
Formally, a(s1, s2) ≡ αs¯(s1, s2) + (1 − α)s(s1, s2) with probability 1
for some α ∈ (0, 1), where α is an exogenous parameter that mea-
sures the attention that the consumer devotes to the high marketing
signal. The interpretation is that the consumer receives the market-
ing signals from both firms prior to starting the search process and
forms an aspiration price by somehow combining the high and the low
signal through a more or less conscious process. Unlike the limited-
comparability aspiration-price function, this function is deterministic
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and allows for the possibility that the aspiration price is not necessarily
extreme.
The remainder of the paper focuses on the convex-combination aspiration-
price function. From now on, since the convex-combination aspiration-price
function is deterministic, I slightly abuse notation by denoting the ‘realized’
aspiration price by a(s1, s2).
4 Equilibrium Analysis
Unlike standard Bertrand, the proposed model does not possess symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria.10 If both firms choose s = 0, the consumer’s aspi-
ration price is 0 and firms have an incentive to reduce the price to zero by
standard Bertrand arguments. However, choosing (p, s) = (0, 0) is not an
equilibrium, because each firm i has an incentive to deviate to (α, 1). The
reason is that at the deviation the consumer’s aspiration price is α and, in
the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned to firm i, he finds
firm i’s price satisfactory. This implies that he does not inspect firm j and
buys firm i’s product. Hence, firm i makes α
2
> 0 profits. On the other
hand, if both firms choose s = 1, the consumer does not search, as his as-
piration price is 1, and firms have an incentive to raise the price to one. At
(p, s) = (1, 1), firms make 1
2
profits. However, (1, 1) is not an equilibrium
either, because each firm i can profitably deviate by reducing the consumer’s
aspiration price to α (by choosing s = 0) and charging a price  > 0 smaller
than 1. In this way firm i ensures that the consumer finds the price charged
by both firms unsatisfactory and buys firm i’s product with probability one,
as it is cheaper. At the deviation firm i makes 1−  profits that are greater
10In fact it does not possess asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria either.
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than 1
2
for a sufficiently small .
The max-min payoff will play a relevant role in the equilibrium analysis.
It turns out that the minimum level of profits that a firm can guarantee in this
model is positive. Assume that a firm i chooses (p, s) = (α, 1). Independently
of how the other firm responds, the consumer’s aspiration price is either
α (if firm j chooses s = 0) or 1 (if firm j chooses s = 1). Hence, by
charging at most α, firm i ensures that in the state of the world in which
the consumer is assigned to it, he will stop searching at firm i and buy its
product. This implies that firm i makes at least α
2
profits. Firm i can possibly
make higher profits in the case firm j charges an unsatisfactory price with
some probability, but this will not happen under the max-min assumption. It
follows that the unique max-minimizer is (α, 1) and the corresponding max-
min payoff is α
2
. A strong implication for the equilibrium analysis is that the
equilibrium-profit lower-bound is positive and equal to α
2
.
Throughout the analysis I denote a symmetric mixed-strategy by σ ≡
〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉, where λ(s) is the probability that the marketing signal
s is sent out and F s is the cdf pricing strategy conditional on the firm sending
out signal s.
As an illustration assume that a firm i chooses the pure strategy (p, s) =
(p, 0) with p ≤ α against the other firm choosing some mixed strategy σ.11
Then, firm i’s profits are
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
{
λ(0)[1− F 0(p)] + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
]}
(1)
The interpretation is that with probability λ(0) firm j sends out a low
signal making the consumer’s aspiration price equal to a(0, 0) = 0. In this
case the consumer makes a price comparison with probability 1 and buys
11For the sake of the illustration, I assume that F 0 is atomless.
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from firm i whenever it is cheaper than firm j, which occurs with probability
1−F 0(p). On the other hand, whenever firm j sends out a high signal, which
occurs with probability λ(1), the consumer’s aspiration price is a(0, 1) = α.
Since the price that firm i charges is lower than α, then in the state of
the world in which the consumer is assigned to firm i (which occurs with
probability 1
2
), he stops searching at firm i and buys from it, as its price is
satisfactory. On the contrary, in the state of the world in which the consumer
is assigned to firm j, he inspects firm i only if the price that firm j charges
is greater than α. Whenever the consumer does so, he buys from firm i,
because while the price that firm j charges is unsatisfactory, the price that
firm i charges is not. The latter occurs with probability 1−F
1(α)
2
. So overall
firm i’s profits are given by the price p it charges times the probability that
the consumer buys firm i’s product.
The equilibrium pricing and marketing strategies turn out to be different
depending on whether α is greater or smaller than a threshold. I examine
the two cases separately.
Theorem 1 (α < 2
3
). There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
firms send out a low marketing signal with probability 2−α
3α+2
and a high mar-
keting signal with probability 4α
3α+2
. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms
randomize over the price according to the following cdf.
F 0(p) ≡

0 if p < α
1+α
2(1+α)
2−α − 2αp(2−α) if p ∈
[
α
1+α
, α
]
2α
2−α if p ∈
(
α, 2α
2−α
)
2+α
2−α − 2αp(2−α) if p ∈
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
1 otherwise
Conditional on sending a high signal, firms set the price at α and 1 with
equal probability.
According to theorem 1, conditional on sending out a low marketing sig-
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nal, firms randomize over the price according to an atomless cdf. On the
contrary, conditional on sending out a high signal, firms charge two prices
- α and 1 - with positive probability. As one expects, the probability that
firms send out a high signal is increasing in the attention α that the consumer
devotes to the high signal. See figure 1 for a graphical representation of the
supports of F 0 and F 1 when α < 2
3
.
-
F 0
-
F 1
0
t
α
1+α
t
t
α
t
2α
2−α
d
t
1
Figure 1: The support of F 0 and F 1 when α < 2
3
An interesting feature of the above equilibrium is that the support of F 0
contains a gap located at the interval
(
α, 2α
2−α
)
. The reason is that, condi-
tional on sending out a low signal, by increasing the price from α to a price
above α there is a discontinuity in the profits, as firms suddenly lose market
power. To gain an intuition of why this is the case I now compute a firm i’s
expected profits of choosing (p′, 0) with p′ > α against some mixed-strategy
σ.
pi((p′, 0), σ) = p′
{
λ(0)[1− F 0(p′)] + λ(1)[1− F 1(p′)]} (2)
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By comparing the above expected profits (eq.(2)) with the expected prof-
its of choosing the strategy (p, 0) with p ≤ α (see eq. (1)), it can be seen
that there is a difference in the realization in which firm j sends out a high
signal. In particular as long as firm i charges a price at most equal to α, it
guarantees that in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned
to it, he stops searching at firm i, as its price is satisfactory, regardless of
the price charged by firm j. On the contrary, as soon as firm i increases its
price above α, it makes its price unsatisfactory implying that in the state of
the world in which the consumer is assigned to firm i, he will inspect firm
j. For a sufficiently small  > 0, this discontinuity in profits implies that an
increase in the price from α to α+  does not offset the reduction in market
shares.
Unlike F 0, the equilibrium pricing cdf F 1 is ‘extreme’ in the sense that it
consists of two atoms located at α and 1 - the consumer’s aspiration prices
when a firm chooses s = 0 and the other s = 1. While the detailed proof
of why this is the case can be found in the appendix, here I provide just
an intuition by discussing three observations. First, conditional on sending
a high signal, it does not make sense for a firm to charge a price strictly
below α, because in the worst case (when the other firm chooses s = 0)
the consumer’s aspiration price is α. Hence, charging a price below α yields
the same market shares as charging α, but generates lower profits. This
implies that whenever a firm sends out a high signal, it never charges a price
below α. Second, as for F 0, increasing the price from α to a price above
α conditional on sending out a high signal reduces market power, because
the prices above α are unsatisfactory when firms send out different signals.
Third, conditional on sending a high signal, the market shares that a firm
obtains when the other firm sends out a high signal as well are independent
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of the price that firm i charges. The reason is that when both firms send
out a high signal the consumer’s aspiration price is equal to one implying
that he sticks to the default regardless of the price they charge. This clearly
incentivizes firms to charge the highest possible price.
I now examine the second case.
Theorem 2 (α ≥ 2
3
). There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
firms send out a low marketing signal with probability 1−α and a high signal
with probability α. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms randomize over
the price according to the following cdf.
F 0(p) ≡

0 if p < α
3−2α
3−2α
2(1−α) − α2(1−α)p if p ∈
[
α
3−2α , α
]
1 otherwise
Conditional on sending a high signal, firms set the price at α and 1 with
probability 2α−1
α
and 1−α
α
, respectively.
The main difference between the equilibrium strategies of theorem 1 and
those of theorem 2 is that, unlike in theorem 1, in theorem 2 the equilibrium
cdf F 0 assigns no mass to the prices above α. The intuition behind this result
can be gained by looking at figure 1. By increasing α, the gap in the support
of F 0 discussed above shifts to the right and, as a result, the right portion of
the support (i.e.,
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
) shrinks. As soon as α increases above a certain
threshold (i.e., 2
3
), the right portion of the support disappears. It turns out
that this ‘disappearance’ has a strong impact on the consumer’s welfare.
Corollary 1 (Firms profits). In equilibrium firms profits are
• 2α
3α+2
, if α < 2
3
• α
2
, if α ≥ 2
3
Firms profits increase with α in absolute value. However, the extent
to which consumers get exploited measured as the difference between firms
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profits and the max-min payoff is not monotonic in α. Firms profits are
greater than the max-min payoff when α < 2
3
and equal to it elsewhere. In
particular the maximum degree of exploitation occurs for a value of α strictly
between zero and one as the next corollary illustrates.
Corollary 2 (Maximum Exploitation). In equilibrium the difference between
firms profits and the max-min payoff is maximized at α = 2
3
(
√
2− 1) ' 0.28.
The economic significance of this result is that if the attention that the
consumer devotes to the high marketing signal is sufficiently low, then com-
petitive forces are unable to drive firms profits to the max-min level. That
is, in a competitive market in which firms can influence the consumer’s aspi-
ration price and the weight that the consumer assigns to the high marketing
signal is not too high, the satisficing consumer gets exploited. An implication
of this finding is that incentivizing a more ex-ante active search behaviour by
reducing α below a certain threshold, on the one hand, reduces firms profits
in absolute terms, but, on the other hand, has the perverse effect of leading
to consumer’s exploitation.
Figure 2: Industry profits (blue line) vs industry max-min (red line) against
α
As anticipated the intuition behind this surprising result is linked with
the structure of the support of the equilibrium cdf F 0. I now compute the ex-
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pected profits of choosing the max-minimizer (α, 1) against a mixed-strategy
σ.
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
{
λ(0)
[
1
2
+
1− F 0(α)
2
]
+
λ(1)
2
}
Notice that pi((α, 1), σ) is equal to the max-min payoff α
2
if and only if
F 0(α) = 1. However, in equilibrium, when α < 2
3
, the probability that firms
charge prices below α conditional on sending out a low signal is less than
one, because F 0 assigns positive mass to an interval above α (i.e.,
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
)
implying that firms make higher profits than the max-min payoff. On the
contrary, when α ≥ 2
3
, F 0(α) = 1 and expected profits are equal to the max-
min payoff. The implication of this observation is that the source of extra
profits is given by the fact that when α is small, conditional on choosing
s = 0, firms charge prices greater than α that do not meet any consumer’s
aspiration price (neither 0 nor α).
As α increases, the consumer’s intermediate aspiration price increases
allowing firms to charge relatively higher prices. However, at the same time
the probability that unsatisfactory prices are charged conditional on firms
choosing s = 0 decreases, implying that the source of extra profits above the
max-min level gets reduced. Figure 2 shows how this tradeoff is resolved by
illustrating industry profits in equilibrium and the max-min payoff against
α.
The remainder of the section examines the consumer search behaviour
and the switching rate.
Corollary 3 (Probability that only one firm is inspected). The equilibrium
probability that only one firm is inspected is
• 2α(11α+2)
(3α+2)2
, if α < 2
3
• −2α2 + 4α− 1, if α ≥ 2
3
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Figure 3: Equilibrium probability that only one firm is inspected against α
As one expects, the probability that only one firm is inspected is in-
creasing with α. However, the rate at which the probability increases is not
monotonic in α, as it peaks when α = 80
456
and then it starts to decrease when
α < 2
3
and is constant when α ≥ 2
3
.12 See figure 3 for a graphical illustration.
Corollary 4 (Switching Rate). The equilibrium switching rate is
• −15α2+12α+4
2(3α+2)2
, if α < 2
3
• 3
2
(1− α)2, if α ≥ 2
3
Finally, as corollary 4 suggests, the switching rate is decreasing with α.
As expected, it starts at 0.5 when α = 0 and progressively decline to 0 when
α = 1. However, the rate at which it decreases first increases and then at
α = 1
3
starts to decline with a discontinuity at α = 2
3
.13 See figure 4 for a
graphical illustration.
12The first derivative of the probability that only one firm is inspected is 76α+8(3α+2)3 when
α < 23 and 4 − 4α when α > 23 . Both are positive for any admissible value of α. The
second derivative is 80−456α3α+2 when α <
2
3 and −4 when α ≥ 23 . The former is positive if
and only if α < 80456 ' 0.18 when α is positive and the latter is always negative.
13The first derivatives are − 48α(3α+2)3 when α < 23 and 3α− 3 when α ≥ 23 and are clearly
both negative. The second derivatives are 96(3α−1)(3α+2)2 when α <
2
3 and 3 when α ≥ 23 . The
former is positive when α > 13 and the latter is always positive.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium switching rate (blue line) vs probability that a price
comparison is made (red line) against α
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I investigate a price-competition model in which the consumer is
satisficing and firms influence the consumer’s aspiration price via marketing.
In the introduction I posed three research questions to which I now provide
the answers. First, firms send out with positive probability both marketing
signals (called high) aimed at increasing and marketing signals (called low)
aimed at decreasing the consumer’s aspiration price. The probability with
which the high marketing signal is sent out is increasing in the attention
that the consumer devotes - in forming his aspiration price - to the high
signal. Second, firms’ pricing strategies are stochastic and dependent on the
marketing strategies. Conditional on sending a low signal, firms randomize
over the price according to an atomless cdf, whose support is not connected.
Conditional on sending out a high signal, firms charge two prices only with
positive probability - the consumer’s aspiration prices conditional on one firm
sending out a high signal. Third, firms’ profits increase in absolute value in
the attention that the consumer devotes to the high signal. However, the
satisficing consumer gets exploited whenever the attention that he devotes
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to the high signal is below a certain threshold.
The main contribution is two-fold. First, it adds on the behavioural indus-
trial organization literature on price competition with homogeneous products
(Carlin, 2009; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chiovenau and Zhou, 2013). In
particular unlike the existing models, my framework assumes that whether a
price comparison is made depends on both the marketing and pricing strate-
gies. Second, the paper shows that incentivizing an ex-ante active search
behaviour, on the one hand, reduces firms profits in an absolute sense and,
on the other hand, leads to exploitation in the sense that firms make higher
profits than the max-min level, suggesting that a ‘more satisficing’ consumer
does not translate into more exploitation.
Below I acknowledge the main limitations of the model and outline pos-
sible extensions. First, even though the ex-post equilibrium aspiration price
is stochastic, I assume the aspiration-price function to be deterministic and,
as a result, do not investigate whether results are robust to heterogeneity in
the consumer’s aspiration price. An interesting exercise to address this point
would be to enrich the current analysis by assuming a stochastic aspiration-
price function.
Second, another extension would be to assume that the consumer up-
dates his aspiration price (upwards or downwards) during the search process
depending on the prices he sequentially discovers. This challenging modifi-
cation would make the model closer to the original idea by Herbert Simon.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1. Assume that α < 2
3
. Let σ = 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉 denote a
symmetric equilibrium (mixed-) strategy. Denote by psL and p
s
H the infimum
and the supremum of the support of F s. I prove the statement in a series of
steps.
Step 1: p0L > 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, choosing (0, 0) yields zero profits. However,
choosing the max-minimizer (α, 1) with probability one yields positive prof-
its. Hence, a firm can profitably deviate, which leads to a contradiction.
Step 2: p1L ≥ α.
Proof. Assume that a firm chooses s = 1. Then, the consumer’s induced
aspiration price is either α or 1. Hence, charging a price strictly below
α yields the same market shares as charging the price at least at α, but
generates lower profits. Hence, each firm never sets a price strictly below α
whenever it chooses s = 1.
Step 3: F 0 is atomless.
Proof. By step 1, p0H > 0. Assume, by contradiction, that F
0 has an atom
of size A > 0 at p ∈ (0, 1]. Suppose first that p ≤ α. Then, choosing (p, 0)
against σ yields p
{
λ(0)
(
1− F 0(p) + A
2
)
+ λ(1)
(
1
2
+ 1−F (α)
2
)}
. Assume that
firm i deviates to p−. The deviation yields (p−) {λ(0) (1− F 0(p− ) +A+
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ 1−F (α)
2
)
. Note that for a sufficiently small  the deviation is prof-
itable. Next, assume that p > α. Then, pi((p, 0), σ) = p
{
λ(0)
(
1− F 0(p) + A
2
)
+λ(1) (1− F 1(p)). Assume that firm i deviates to p−. This deviation yields
(p− ) {λ(0) (1− F 0(p− ) + A) +λ(1) (1− F 1(p− )). Note that for a suf-
ficiently small  the deviation is profitable. Hence, F 0 is atomless.
Step 4: p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
Proof. I first show that p0H ≥ α. Suppose not. Hence, p0H < α. Then,
choosing (p0H , 0) against σ yields p
0
H
{
λ(1)
[
1
2
+ A
2
]}
, as, by step 2, p1L ≥ α,
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where A is the probability that p1 is strictly greater than α. Assume that firm
i deviates to (α, 0). This deviation yields α
{
λ(1)
[
1
2
+ A
2
]}
and is profitable
if and only if p0H < α, which is true by assumption, a contradiction.
Next, suppose, by contradiction, that p0H ∈ (α, 1). Note that choosing
(p0H , 1) yields p
0
H
{
λ(1)
2
}
. However, deviating to (1, 1) is profitable, as this
strategy yields λ(1)
2
. This implies that the interval [p0H , 1) cannot be in the
support of F 1. Note that (p0H , 0) yields p
0
H {λ(1)B}, where B is the proba-
bility that p0H is less than p
1. Assume that a firm deviates to (p′, 0), where
p′ ∈ (p0H , 1). The deviation yields p′ {λ(1)B}, as the interval [p0H , 1) is not in
the support of F 1, and is profitable, as p′ > p0H . However, this contradicts
the fact that p0H is the highest price in the support of F
0.
Hence, it must be that p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
In the reminder of the proof I assume that p0H = 1. I will consider the
p0H = α case in theorem 2.
Step 5: F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
, p0H = 1 is not included in the
support of F 0, and firms profits are λ(1)
2
.
Proof. By step 4, p0H = 1 is the supremum. Assume, by contradiction, that
F 1 does not have an atom at p = 1. But then, pi((1, 0), σ) = 0. However,
choosing the max-minimizer (α, 1) with probability one yields strictly pos-
itive profits, a contradiction. Hence, F 1 does have an atom at p = 1 and
choosing (1, 1) against σ yields λ(1)
2
. Assume that the size of the atom is
A > 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that p0H = 1 is included in the support
of F 0. Then, choosing (1, 0) against σ yields λ(1)A
2
. Assume that a firm
deviates to 1 −  conditional on advertising s = 0. This deviation yields
(1 − ) {λ(0) [1− F 0(1− )] + λ(1) [A+ (1− F 1(1− ))]}. For a sufficiently
small  the deviation is profitable. Hence, p0H = 1 is not the greatest element
of the support of F 1. However, note that limp→−1 pi((p, 0), σ) = λ(1)A. Since
pi((1, 1), σ) = λ(1)
2
, then, by equating these two and solving for A, A = 1
2
.
Step 6: p1L > p
0
L.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Suppose first that p1L < p
0
L. Then, pi((p
1
L, 1), σ) =
p1L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
. Assume that a firm deviates to (p0L, 1). By step 3, F
0
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is atomless. Hence, the deviation yields p0L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
, which is strictly
greater than pi((p1L, 1), σ), a contradiction. Next, assume that p
1
L = p
0
L = p.
Step 2 rules out the possibility that p < α. Hence, assume that p ≥ α. I
distinguish two cases.
Case (i): F 1 has an atom at p = p¯. Let B > 0 denote the size of
this atom. By step 5, B is at most 1
2
. Assume first that p = α. Then,
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+ (1−B)
2
])
and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
.
These two profits are the same if and only if B = 1, a contradiction. Next,
assume that p > α. Note that pi((p, 0), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
B
2
+ (1−B)]),
as F 1 has an atom at p¯, and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
. These two profits
are the same if and only if B = 1, a contradiction.
Case (ii): F 1 does not have an atom at p = p. Then, pi((p, 0), σ) = p
and pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
2
)
independently of whether p is equal to or
strictly greater than α. Note that these two profits are different, a contra-
diction.
Step 7: p1L = α and p
0
L < α.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that p1L > α. I distinguish two cases.
Case (i): p1L belongs to the support of F
0. Assume first that F 1 does not
have an atom at p1L. Note that pi((p
1
L, 1), σ) = p
1
L
(
λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)2
)
and pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)). These two payoffs differ, a
contradiction. Next, assume that F 1 does have an atom at p1L of size G. Note
that pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L
(
λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L)] + λ(1)
(
G
2
+ 1−G)). However, de-
viating to (p1L− , 0) is profitable as long as  is sufficiently small, as it yields
pi((p1L − , 0), σ) = (p1L − ) (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L − )] + λ(1)), a contradiction.
Case (ii): p1L does not belong to the support of F
0. Then there exists
an interval (p, p¯) ⊂ (0, 1) such that p1L ∈ (p, p¯) for which F 0 is flat. Notice
that pi((p, 0), σ) = p [λ(0)(1− F 0(p¯)) + λ(1)]. Assume first that F 1 does not
have an atom at p1L. Then, deviating to (p
1
L, 0) is profitable, as it yields
pi((p1L, 0), σ) = p
1
L [λ(0)(1− F 0(p¯)) + λ(1)] > pi((p, 0), σ), a contradiction.
Next, assume that F 1 does have an atom at p1L of size G. Deviating to (p
1
L−
, 0) is profitable as long as  is sufficiently small, as it yields pi((p1L−, 0), σ) =
(p1L − ) (λ(0)[1− F 0(p1L − )] + λ(1)) > pi((p, 0), σ), a contradiction.
Hence, it must be that p1L = α. By step 6, p
0
L < α.
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Step 8: F 1 is flat over the interval (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small 
and has an atom at α.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that F 1 is strictly increasing over the inter-
val (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small . But then, pi ((α, 1) , σ) = α
[
λ(0)
(
1
2
+
1−F 0(α)
2
)
+ λ(1)
2
and pi ((α + , 1) , σ) = (α + )
[
λ(0) (1− F (α + )) + λ(1)
2
]
.
For any sufficiently small , pi ((α, 1) , σ) > pi ((α + , 1) , σ), a contradiction.
Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval (α, α + ) for a sufficiently small . By
step 7, α belongs to the support of F 1. Hence, F 1 has an atom at α.
Step 9: F 0 is constant over the interval
(
α, p
)
, for some p < 1.
Proof. Suppose not. By step 8, F 1 has an atom at p = α. Let D > 0
denote the size of this atom. Note that pi ((α, 0) , σ) = α (λ(0) [1− F 0 (α)]
+λ(1)
[
1
2
+ 1
2
(1−D)] and pi ((α + , 0) , σ) = (α + ) (λ(0) [1− F 0 (α + )]
+λ(1) [1− F 1 (α + )]. As long as  is sufficiently small, the first payoff is
greater than the second, a contradiction.
Step 10: F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval [p0L, α] and over the
interval
(
p, 1
)
with p ∈ (α, 1).
Proof. By the previous steps, p0L < α and ∃ an interval (α, p) over which F 0 is
flat for some p ∈ (α, 1). I first show that F 0 is strictly increasing over the in-
terval [p0L, α]. Suppose not. Hence, assume that there is an interval (p
′, p′′) ⊆
[p0L, α] over which F
0 is constant. By step 2, F 1 assigns zero mass to the inter-
val [p0L, α). Note that pi((p
′, 0), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
C
])
,
where C is the probability that F 1 assigns to the prices strictly above α.
On the other hand, pi((p′′, 0), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
C
])
.
The latter is greater than the former, a contradiction. Hence, F 0 is strictly
increasing over the interval [p0L, α].
Next, I show that F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval
(
p, 1
)
for
some p ∈ (α, 1). Suppose not. Then, there is an interval (p′, p′′) ⊆ (p, 1)
over which F 0 is flat. I first show that F 1 assigns no mass to this interval.
The reason is that pi((p′, 1), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1)
2
)
is strictly less
than pi((p′′, 1), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1)
2
)
. Since F 1 assigns no mass
to the interval (p′, p′′), then for the same reasons pi((p′, 0), σ) < pi((p′′, 0),
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a contradiction. Hence, F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval
(
p, 1
)
for
some p ∈ (α, 1).
Step 11: F 1 consists of two atoms of size 1
2
each located at p = α and
p = 1.
Proof. By the previous steps, F 0 is strictly increasing over the intervals [p0L, α]
and
[
p, 1
)
for some p ∈ (α, 1). Moreover, F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
and an atom at p = α. Denote the size of the latter by D > 0.
As shown in step 10, if F 0 is flat over an interval above α, then F 1 must
be flat as well over the same interval. Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval
(α, p). Assume, by contradiction, that F 1 is strictly increasing over some
subset of the interval
[
p, 1
)
. Denote by p, p′ two distinct prices in this inter-
val such that p < p′. Then, pi ((p, 1) , σ) = p
(
λ(0) [1− F 0 (p)] + λ(1)
2
)
and
pi ((p, 0) , σ) = p (λ(0) [1− F 0 (p)] + λ(1)[1− F 1(p)]). By equating these two,
1−F 1(p) = 1
2
. Next, notice that pi ((p′, 1) , σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0 (p′)] + λ(1)
2
)
and pi ((p′, 0) , σ) = p′ (λ(0) [1− F 0 (p′)] + λ(1)(1− F 1(p′)). By equating these
two, 1 − F 1(p′) = 1
2
. But then 1 − F 1(p) = 1 − F 1(p′) = 1
2
, which leads to
a contradiction. Hence, F 1 is flat over the interval (α, 1). By step 5, F 1 has
an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
. Hence, the size of the atom at p = α is 1
2
as
well.
Step 12: the support of F 0 is given by the union of the intervals
[
α
1+α
, α
]
and
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
, λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
, and firms profits are 2α
3α+2
.
Proof. By the previous steps, F 0 is strictly increasing over the intervals [p0L, α]
and
[
p, 1
)
for some p ∈ (α, 1). Moreover, F 1 has an atom at p = 1 of size 1
2
and an atom at p = α of size 1
2
. Next, let B ≡ F 0 (α). Note the following.
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pi
((
p0L, 0
)
, σ
)
= p0L
(
λ(0) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
])
(3)
pi ((α, 0) , σ) = α
(
λ(0)(1−B) + λ(1)
[
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
])
(4)
pi
((
p, 0
)
, σ
)
= p
(
λ(0)(1−B) + λ(1)
2
)
(5)
pi ((α, 1) , σ) = α
(
λ(0)
[
1
2
+
1−B
2
]
+
λ(1)
2
)
(6)
pi ((1, 1) , σ) =
λ(1)
2
(7)
By equating equations 6 and 7 and solving for B, B = 2αλ(0)−λ(1)(1−α)
αλ(0)
.
Next, by equating equations 4 and 7 and solving for λ(1), λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
. Hence,
firms profits in equilibrium are 2α
3α+2
and B = 2α
2−α . By equating equations 3
and 7, p0L =
α
1+α
. Finally, by equating equations 5 and 7, p = 2α
2−α . Notice
that the support of F 0 is well-defined as long as α < 2
3
, which holds by
assumption.
Step 13: F 0 is defined as in the statement of theorem 1.
Proof. By step 12, the support of F 0 is given by the union of the inter-
vals
[
α
1+α
, α
]
and
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
, λ(1) = 4α
3α+2
, and firms profits are 2α
3α+2
. The
expected profits of choosing (p, 0) such that p ∈ [ α
1+α
, α
]
against σ are
given by p
(
2−α
3α+2
(1− F 0(p)) + 4α
3α+2
[
1
2
+ 1
2
1
2
])
= 2α
3α+2
. By solving for F 0(p),
F 0(p) = 2(1+α)
2−α − 2αp(2−α) .
Next, the expected profits of choosing (p, 0) such that p ∈ [ 2α
2−α , 1
)
against
σ are given by p
(
2−α
3α+2
(1− F 0(p)) + 4α
3α+2
1
2
)
= 2α
3α+2
. By solving for F 0(p),
F 0(p) = 2+α
2−α − 2αp(2−α) , as desired.
Step 14: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. By step 12, firms equilibrium profits are 2α
3α+2
. I now check for prof-
itable deviations. I distinguish six sets of deviations.
• Case (i): to (p, 0) such that p < α
1+α
. The deviation yields
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p(
2− α
3α + 2
+
4α
3α + 2
(
1
2
+
1
2
1
2
))
and is profitable if and only if p > α
1+α
, a contradiction.
• Case (ii): to (p, 0) such that p ∈ (α, 2α
2+α
)
. The deviation yields
p
[
2− α
3α + 2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > 2α
2−α , a contradiction.
• Case (iii): to (1, 0). The deviation yields 4α
3α+2
1
2
1
2
and is profitable if
and only if 1 > 2, a contradiction.
• Case (iv): to (p, 1) such that p < α. The deviation yields
p
{
2− α
3α + 2
[
1
2
+
1
2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)]
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
}
and is profitable if and only if p > α, a contradiction.
• Case (v): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ (α, 2α
2−α
)
. The deviation yields
p
[
2− α
3α + 2
(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > 2α
2−α , a contradiction.
• Case (vi): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ [ 2α
2+α
, 1
)
. The deviation yields
p
{
2− α
3α + 2
[
1−
(
2 + α
2− α −
2α
p(2− α)
)]
+
4α
3α + 2
1
2
}
and is profitable if and only if 1 > 1, a contradiction.
There are no profitable deviations.
Hence, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
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Theorem 2. Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. Let σ = 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈Supp(λ)〉 denote a
symmetric equilibrium (mixed-) strategy. As before denote by psL and p
s
H
the infimum and the supremum of the support of F s. The first four steps
(p0L > 0, p
1
L ≥ α, F 0 is atomless, and p0H ∈ {α, 1}) are analogous to those of
the previous theorem and therefore I omit their proof. Throughout I assume
that p0H = α.
14
Step 5: F 1 consists of an atom at p = α and an atom at p = 1 of size
2α−1
α
and 1−α
α
, respectively and firms profits are λ(1)
2
.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that some p ∈ (α, 1) is in the support of
F 1. Then, pi((p, 1), σ) = pλ(1)
2
. But then each firm has an incentive to deviate
to (1, 1), as this yields λ(1)
2
. Hence, the prices in the interval (α, 1) are not
in the support of F 1. Next, suppose, by contradiction, that F 1 does not
have an atom at p = 1. This implies that F 1 has an atom at α of size 1.
Then, pi((α, 0), σ) = αλ(1)
2
. However, each firm has an incentive to deviate
to (1, 1), as this yields λ(1)
2
. Hence, F 1 has an atom at p = 1. This implies
that firms profits in equilibrium are given by λ(1)
2
= pi((1, 1), σ). Notice that
pi((α, 0), σ) = α
[
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ A
2
)]
, where A is the probability that F 1 assigns
to the atom at p = 1. Since (α, 0) is part of the support, then it must yield
the same market shares as (1, 1). Hence, α
[
λ(1)
(
1
2
+ A
2
)]
= λ(1)
2
. By solving
for A, A = 1−α
α
. By the previous steps and the fact that the prices in the
interval (α, 1) are not in the support of F 1, this implies that F 1 has an atom
at p = α of size 1− 1−α
α
= 2α−1
α
.
Step 6: F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval [p0L, α].
Proof. Suppose not. Hence, assume that there is an interval (p′, p′′) ⊆ [p0L, α]
over which F 0 is constant. By step 2, F 1 assigns zero mass to the inter-
val [p0L, α). Note that pi((p
′, 0), σ) = p′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
1−α
α
])
.
On the other hand, pi((p′′, 0), σ) = p′′
(
λ(0) [1− F 0(p′′)] + λ(1) [1
2
+ 1
2
1−α
α
])
.
The latter is greater than the former, a contradiction.
Step 7: λ(1) = α.
14The p0H = 1 case is examined in theorem 1.
32
Proof. Notice that pi((α, 1), σ) = α
[
λ(0)
2
+ λ(1)
2
]
= α
2
and pi((1, 1), σ) = λ(1)
2
.
By equating these two, λ(1) = α and, consequently, firms profits are λ(1)
2
=
α
2
.
Step 8: F 0 is defined as in the statement of theorem 2.
Proof. Let p ∈ [p0L, α]. Notice that
pi((p, 0), σ) = p
[
λ(0)(1− F 0(p)) + λ(1)
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
= p
[
(1− α)(1− F 0(p)) + α
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
= p
[
(1− α)(1− F 0(p)) + 1
2
]
=
α
2
where the last step follows from the fact that firms profits in equilibrium
are α
2
. By solving for F 0, F 0(p) = 3−2α
2(1−α) − α2(1−α)p , as desired. By solving
F (p0L) = 0 for p
0
L, p
0
L =
α
3−2α .
Step 9: the equilibrium exists.
Proof. By step 7, firms equilibrium profits are α
2
. I now check for profitable
deviations. I distinguish four sets of deviations.
• Case (i): to (p, 0) such that p < α
3−2α . The deviation yields
p
[
(1− α) + α
(
1
2
+
1
2
1− α
α
)]
and is profitable if and only if p > α
3−2α , a contradiction.
• Case (ii): to (p, 0) such that p ∈ (α, 1]. The deviation yields
p
(
α
1− α
α
)
and is profitable if and only if p > α
2(1−α) . Notice that the deviation is
feasible if and only if α
2(1−α) < 1 or, equivalently, α <
2
3
. However, this
is impossible, as α ≥ 2
3
holds by assumption.
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• Case (iii): to (p, 1) such that p < α. The deviation yields
p
[
(1− α)1
2
+
α
2
]
and is profitable if and only if p > α, a contradiction.
• Case (iv): to (p, 1) such that p ∈ (α, 1). The deviation yields
p
α
2
and is profitable if and only if p > 1, a contradiction.
There are no profitable deviations.
Hence, the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Corollary 1. Assume α < 2
3
. Note that pi((1, 1), σ) = 4α
3α+2
1
2
= 2α
3α+2
. Next,
assume α ≥ 2
3
. Note that pi((1, 1), σ) = α 1
2
= α
2
.
Corollary 2. The relevant case is when α < 2
3
. The difference between firms
profits and max-min is given by 2α
3α+2
− α
2
. The FOC is −9α
2−12α+4
2(3α+2)2
= 0, which
implies that α = 2
3
(
√
2 − 1). The SOC is satisfied, as the second derivative
− 24
(3α+2)3
is always negative for a positive α.
Corollary 3. Assume that α < 2
3
. Notice that when a(s1, s2) = 1 all prices
are satisfactory and the consumer sticks to the default firm. This happens
when both firms choose s = 1 and occurs with probability
(
4α
3α+2
)2
. Next,
when firm i chooses s = 1 and firm j chooses s = 0, the consumer assigned
to firm i inspects only firm i whenever the price that firm i charges is at
most α. This occurs with probability
(
4α
3α+2
) · ( 2−α
3α+2
) · 1
2
. Next, when firm
i chooses s = 0 and firm j s = 1, the consumer assigned to firm i inspects
only firm i whenever the price that firm i charges is at most α. This occurs
with probability
(
4α
3α+2
) · ( 2−α
3α+2
) · 2α
2−α . Finally, if both firms choose s = 0,
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then all prices are unsatisfactory implying that the consumer inspects both
firms. Hence,
P (one firm is insp.) =
(
4α
3α + 2
)2
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)
1
2
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)
2α
2− α
=
2α(11α + 2)
(3α + 2)2
Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. The same argument applies. Hence,
P (one firm is insp.) = (α)2 + α (1− α)
(
2α− 1
α
)
+ (1− α)α
= −2α2 + 4α− 1
Corollary 4. Assume that α < 2
3
. If both firms choose s = 1, the conversion
rate is zero as the consumer always sticks to the default. Hence, assume that
firm i chooses s = 0 and firm j s = 1. In this case the consumer assigned
to firm i buys from firm j when firm j charges α and firm i a greater price.
This occurs with probability
(
2−α
3α+2
) (
4α
3α+2
) (
1
2
) (
1− 2α
2−α
)
. Next, assume that
firm i chooses s = 1 and firm j s = 0. In this case the consumer assigned
to firm i buys from firm j when firm i charges 1. This occurs with probabil-
ity
(
4α
3α+2
) (
2−α
3α+2
) (
1
2
)
. Finally, when both firms choose s = 0, the consumer
inspects both firms and the conversion rate is 1
2
, as firms strategies are sym-
metric. The probability that the consumer switches away from the default is
given by
P (switching) =
(
2− α
3α + 2
)(
4α
3α + 2
)(
1
2
)(
1− 2α
2− α
)
+
(
4α
3α + 2
)(
2− α
3α + 2
)(
1
2
)
+
(
2− α
3α + 2
)2(
1
2
)
=
−15α2 + 12α + 4
2(3α + 2)2
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Assume that α ≥ 2
3
. A similar argument applies. Hence, the probability
that the consumer switches away from the default is given by
P (switching) = (α) (1− α)
(
1− α
α
)
+ (1− α)2
(
1
2
)
=
3
2
(1− α)2
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